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ABSTRACT
We provide quasi-experimental evidence on the effects of alcohol regulation
on alcohol consumption and associated public health outcomes using detailed
individual level and aggregate data from India, where state level laws
generate substantial variation in the availability of commercially produced
alcohol across people of different ages. We find that despite significant law
evasion, men who are legally allowed to drink are substantially more likely
to consume alcohol. Further, men who are legally allowed to drink are
significantly more likely to commit violence against their partners,
suggesting a causal channel between alcohol consumption and domestic
violence. We also examine the effects of alcohol regulation on other public
health outcomes. Consistent with the existing literature, we find evidence that
smoking and drinking are complements. Finally, we provide suggestive
evidence that stricter alcohol control is associated with lower rates of motor
vehicle accidents and crimes against women, but not other forms of crime.

JEL Classification: I18, K42, J120
Keywords: alcohol consumption, domestic violence, violence against
women, prohibition, minimum legal drinking age, smoking, motor vehicle
accidents
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I. INTRODUCTION
High rates of alcohol consumption are correlated with adverse outcomes at both
individual and societal levels; well-documented examples include increased rates of mortality,
injuries, motor vehicle accidents, and criminal activity (Carpenter and Dobkin 2009). The
regulation of alcohol consumption in developed countries has been shown to causally affect at
least some of these outcomes (Carpenter and Dobkin 2011). However, there is little evidence on
the impacts of alcohol regulation in the context of developing countries, where rapidly changing
demographic trends and consumption patterns, combined with weaker institutions, warrant a
pressing need for a closer examination. Luca, Owens and Sharma (2015) provide suggestive
evidence that alcohol prohibition laws in India are effective in reducing consumption even with
imperfect implementation, and that prohibition significantly reduces intimate partner violence, as
well as some other crimes against women. The effectiveness and effects of other (and perhaps
less fiscally and politically costly) regulatory measures, such as varying the minimum legal
drinking age, however, are still questions in need of answers.
In this paper, we combine a newly collected set of alcohol regulations – minimum legal
drinking age and prohibition status - across states in India to assess their effects on important
public health outcomes, including domestic violence, alcohol and tobacco consumption, motor
vehicle accidents, and crime. India provides a unique setting to study this question, as it is one of
the few countries in the world where there is considerable spatial and temporal variation in
alcohol regulation policies across states. A number of states prohibit alcohol consumption
altogether, and in others the minimum legal drinking age (MLDA) varies from 18 to 25 years
old. In contrast, previous studies in Western countries have relied on narrower bands of MLDAs:
21 in the United States, 18 or 19 in Canada, 18 in Mexico, or 16 to 18 in Europe (Carpenter and
3

Dobkin 2011). This wider variation allows us to better isolate the impact of the alcohol
regulation from the effect of biological aging or other policy factors.
Further, as in many recently developed and developing countries, Indian alcohol policies
are still in flux. For example, the state of Mizoram removed prohibition in 2014, the state of
Kerela started phasing in prohibition in the same year, and the state of Bihar began enforcing
prohibition in 2016. In addition, high profile cases of drunken driving, murders, and violence
against women in India have recently received worldwide attention, with the popular narrative
focusing on alcohol consumption and the need for policy interventions. These findings are also
relevant for the United States and the developed world, where there has been increasing scrutiny
on the connection between drinking and sexual violence, most recently focusing on college
campuses (Sampson 2002).1
Using micro-level survey data, we first attempt to establish a first-stage relationship
between alcohol regulation and consumption in the Indian context. Estimates of this relationship
is per se important given the lack of research on the impact of alcohol regulation in the context
of developing countries, where costs of alcohol use are arguably larger.2 There is also evidence
that easily evaded state level regulations are less effective at reducing alcohol consumption (Dills
and Miron 2004, Lovenheim and Slemrod 2010). It follows that an important question facing
policy makers in developing countries is whether government regulation is effective at all,

1

Due to a number of high-profile sexual assault cases that involved alcohol, ten schools have enacted alcohol bans
in certain settings in order to combat sexual assaults, as many others consider following suit.
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/will-dartmouths-hard-alcohol-ban-make-students-safer/
2
Pre-existing nutritional problems, lack of health care infrastructure, and economic deprivation can aggravate social
cost of problematic drinking (Prasad 2009). Poor product regulation can also result in the consumption of low
quality or adulterated alcohol, particularly the use of methyl alcohol, which can lead to death or serious organ
damage, in particular blindness (Saxena 1999).
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particularly in the presence of strong black markets and perceived weaker rule of law relative to
the US or Canada (Allen et al., 2008).
Our data confirm that a large fraction of men under the legal drinking age consume
alcohol. In spite of non-trivial law evasion, however, by comparing the prevalence of alcohol
consumption among men above and below the drinking age in the same state, and men of the
same age across states with different age restrictions governing alcohol sales, we find that
regulations reducing access to alcohol are associated with substantive reductions in the
consumption of the good in question. Indeed, our results demonstrate while legal access does not
determine alcohol consumption absolutely, it does significantly affect the likelihood of alcohol
consumption – men who are of legal drinking age are almost 30 percent more likely to drink
alcohol, which is quite similar to results found in developed countries (e.g. Carpenter and Dobkin
2010). Further, we show that being of legal drinking age is positively linked to smoking, which is
consistent with existing literature from developed country settings that drinking and smoking are
complements (Decker and Schwartz 2000, Dee 1999).
We then demonstrate that husbands who are legally allowed to drink are both
substantially more likely to consume alcohol and commit domestic violence against their
partners. The results are robust to controlling for a rich set of individual-level characteristics and
both observed and unobserved state level variation. According to a study conducted by the World
Health Organization, a third of violent husbands drink, and most of the violence takes place
during intoxication. In the United States, close to 40% of police calls for domestic violence
involve alcohol (McClelland and Teplin 2001). Studies of partner violence episodes also indicate
that episodes are more severe when the man has been drinking (Leonard and Quigley 1999,
McKinney et al. 2010). However, previous studies have found it difficult to disentangle the
5

effects of alcohol consumption from unobserved risk factors that may be both correlated with
drinking and violent behaviors. Using exogenous state variation in alcohol regulation, our results
provide evidence that drinking may be a causal factor in domestic violence. To the extent that a
substantively important causal relationship between alcohol consumption and domestic violence
exists, alcohol regulation is a potentially promising lever that policy makers could use to reduce
violence against women.
We then look at the effects of alcohol control on various public health outcomes using
state-year panel data in 16 states between 1980 and 2010 that may be affected by alcohol
regulation. Consistent with our analysis using individual-level data, our results using state-year
panel data suggest that policies restricting alcohol access may have a secondary social benefit of
reducing some forms of violence against women, including molestation, sexual harassment,
cruelty by husband and relatives. At the same time, changes in the MLDA do not appear to be
associated with reductions in criminal behavior more broadly. We find suggestive evidence that
stricter regulation is associated with lower fatalities rates from motor vehicle accidents and
alcohol consumption, but also deaths due to consuming spurious liquor (alcohol that is produced
illicitly).
The paper proceeds as follows: in section II, we characterize the cultural context and
evolution of alcohol consumption and alcohol regulation. We describe how we measure these
changes in section III. We present our general empirical strategy in section IV, followed by our
individual level and state panel results in Section V. Section VI concludes.
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II. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING: CULTURAL AND LEGAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS
ALCOHOL IN INDIA
Compared to the United States, Canada, and the UK, Indian state government regulations
provide a compelling large-scale social policy “experiment” in which to examine the
consequences of alcohol regulation. The range of alcohol policies vary substantially both across
Indian states and within states over time, which we were able to document 19 of the 29 Indian
states, where roughly 90% of the 2001 Indian population lives. Between 1980 and 2008, the time
frame for our analysis, the MLDA ranged from 18 to 25 years across the country, and some
states had blanket prohibition policies. In addition, we identified six states that changed their
MLDA at least once; Bihar increased its MLDA from 18 to 21 in 1985, and Tamil Nadu repealed
prohibition and enacted an 18 year old MLDA in 1990, then subsequently increased it to 21 in
2005. Andhra Pradesh and Haryana both enacted prohibitionary policies in 1995 (the MLDA in
Andhra Pradesh had been 21, and 25 in Haryana) only to later repeal them in 1998 and 1999.
Maharashtra lowered its MLDA to 21 from 25 for one year (2005), and Orissa supplanted its 21
year old MLDA with blanket prohibition in 1994 and 1995.
Several features of Indian society are responsible for these variations in alcohol
regulations. Compared to opium and marijuana, alcohol is a relatively less popular intoxicant in
India until colonial rule. At the same time that British occupation promoted alcohol use, British
MP William S. Caine founded the first prohibitionary organization, the Anglo-Indian
Temperance Association (AITA), in 1888. The Indian temperance movement gained
considerable strength during the 1920s, such that it led to a considerable decrial of alcohol and
its derivatives. The success of the AITA, combined with religious diktats denouncing the sin of
intoxication, resulted in a substantial increase in the taxation of such products, with a view to
7

decrease their consumption (Hardiman 2006). The agitation which led to the most decisive
political action on the issue was the Gandhian movement; during the struggle for independence
in the1940s temperance came to be closely associated with nationalism. Alcohol consumption
was seen as a “Western evil” which distracted the people from their quest for independence
(Blocker et al. 2003).
Upon Independence in 1947, temperance was enshrined in Article 47 of the Constitution
of India, as a part of the Directive Principles of State Policy, which reads “The State shall regard
the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people.” The prejudice
against alcohol remains in modern society, and alcohol is rarely served at any important events
(Health 1995, Mohan et al. 2001). Alcohol is also primarily consumed by males; female alcohol
consumption is generally uncommon, and alcohol consumption by women outside the home (e.g.
in bars or restaurants) is particularly taboo (Benegal et al. 2005).
Upon Independence, Indian states were granted control over policies regulating sales and
consumption of alcohol.3 Similar to in the US, variation in alcohol regulation is partly driven by
a demand for revenue by individual state governments. Where it is legal, alcohol is taxed heavily
at the state level, and Indian states derive around a fifth of their revenue from alcohol taxationthe second largest single source of government funding after sales taxes (Saxena 1999).
Moreover, there is a long history in India of a powerful alcohol lobby with industry figures

3

The Indian constitution divides important issues and revenue sources into three lists – the Union list (on which the
parliament has exclusive power to legislate) contains items like defense, foreign affairs, income taxes, customs
duties, corporate taxes etc.; the State list (on which individual states have exclusive authority to legislate and tax )
includes public order, police, public health and sanitation, land revenue, taxes on agricultural income, taxes on lands
on buildings, estate duty, taxes on electricity, taxes on vehicles, taxes on luxuries including alcohol; and the
Concurrent list (the responsibility for which is shared by the Centre and States) which includes contracts, bankruptcy
and insolvency, trustees and trusts, civil procedure.
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influencing the political process, both in the form of party donations and as representatives
(Prasad 2009).
Attitudes towards alcohol consumption in India have more recently evolved in large part
due to the combined forces of globalization, prosperity, and changing demographics. Researchers
have noted that alcohol consumption has increased dramatically over the past 30 years, and
survey evidence suggests that Indians are beginning to drink at ever-younger ages (Mohan et al.
2001, Prasad 2009, Saxena 1999). Problematic drinking is now prevalent in many parts of the
country; according to a recent Lancet report, alcohol-related problems account for more than
20% of hospital admissions; 18% of psychiatric emergencies; more than 20% of all brain injuries
and 60% of all injuries reporting to India’s emergency rooms (Prasad 2009). As we will show,
there is some evidence that Indian states which loosened alcohol restrictions over the past 30
years did so in response to lower levels of crime. The dynamic push-and-pull of cultural
prejudices, changing societal mores, increasing public policy concern over alcohol-related issues,
and state incentives to keep alcohol flowing, has led to an amount of flux in alcohol regulation
that is not seen in most western countries.
III.

DATA

III.A. Data on Alcohol Regulation in India
In order to evaluate the effects of alcohol regulation, we compiled a dataset of state-level
laws and regulations pertaining to alcohol (sales and/or consumption), with particular attention to
MLDAs for the time period 1980-2010 in India. Tracing amendments to minimum drinking age
laws over time by state was a complex process. Even the well-known and much used database on
Indian law, Manupatra, does not provide a complete chronological list of amendments to
national, let alone state, laws. Further, most documentation of the history of state legislation
9

exists only in hard copy in legal libraries. We employed a number of law students from across
India to research and summarize the history of alcohol-related legislation in their home state. In
this paper, we focus only on the non-price aspect of alcohol regulation, i.e. we do not include
analysis on state taxes on alcohol.4
Based on the legal analysis, we were able to document the historical evolution of MLDA
and prohibitionary laws in 18 states from 1980 to 2009, and in 19 states in 1998, 1999, 2005 and
2006.5 Figure 1 depicts a map of India with the MLDA in each state that we have information for
during this time period. Multiple numbers in a state implies the state has had an MLDA set at
each age at some point between 1980 and 2010.
III.B. Individual Level Data on Drinking, Domestic Violence, and Smoking
In order to evaluate the impact of alcohol regulation on individual behaviors, we use the
1998-1999 and 2005-2006 waves of the Indian National Family Health Survey (NFHS). The
NFHS is a large-scale, multi-round survey conducted in a representative sample of households
throughout India which is intended to provide state and national level information for India on a
wealth of issues, including consumption of harmful substances such as alcohol and tobacco. This
allows us to test whether alcohol control regulations (such as higher MLDAs or prohibition) have
a causal effect on alcohol consumption. The link between smoking and alcohol regulation is

4

The complex nature of state taxes on alcohol in India makes summarizing them in a uniform and comprehensive
way across states and time is difficult. There are different taxes on different kind of alcohols within and across states
(for ex., foreign imported liquor versus domestically produced beer, etc.) Duties range from flat-fees to percentages
of the manufactured cost, retail price or the government-set market price. Further, the taxes can be levied on
different units, ranging from per bulk liter to by proof level (Rahman 2003). Prohibition and alcohol regulations by
age, however, are relatively more straightforward. We also include state-by-wave fixed effects in some
specifications, which absorb any potential state-time changes in alcohol taxes.
5
These are the major states in India from which reliable data are available. A number of northeastern states such as
Nagaland, Manipur, Meghalaya, Assam, Tripura, Sikkim suffered from insurgency and terrorism issues and many
important data collection efforts (including manufacturing and household surveys, economic census etc.) were not
conducted for several years.
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more complicated, and is predicated on whether alcohol and tobacco are substitutes or
complements (Decker and Schwartz 2000). If alcohol control regulations reduce drinking then
they will increase (decrease) incidences of smoking if tobacco and alcohol are substitutes
(complements).
Importantly, for our purposes, in these waves of the NFHS, a subset of women was asked
about their exposure to domestic violence in the previous year and in general. Both waves are
intended to produce state and national level estimates, and individual responses in both the full
survey and domestic violence sample can be weighted to represent all households, or all women
in each state.
While the NFHS contains rich household and individual data, we recognize that using
self-reported data could be problematic due to underreporting, especially on the topic of
domestic violence. That said, special attention was given to the domestic violence module in the
women questionnaire portion of the NFHS. For example, the women’s questionnaire (that
includes information on violence) is conducted separately from the household survey by trained
female interviewers, so that the women have privacy when answering the questions, and the
women are also assured that their answers will be kept strictly confidential. In the 2005 wave,
women were also provided, on request, information on sources of help for abused women. These
precautions are in keeping with the World Health Organization’s ethical and safety
recommendations for research on domestic violence (IIPS 2007).
Table 1A presents summary statistics describing drinking, smoking, domestic violence,
and other measures of household and women’s status in the NFHS, for both men overall and
husbands from ages 15 to 50. The problem of partner abuse appears to be acute in India, but
comparable to the likely incidence of domestic violence in the US. In our data, around 18% of
11

married women experienced violence at the hands of their husband specifically;6 a much-cited
1995 survey found that 25% of women in the US experienced some form of domestic violence in
their lifetime (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000)7 and in 2010 the World Health Organization estimated
that roughly 38% of ever-partnered women in South-East Asia experienced some form of
intimate partner violence in their lifetime (World Health Organization 2013).
Approximately 30% of husbands are reported to consume alcohol, which was reported by
whoever filled out the household survey in 1998 and by the husband directly in 2005.8 Relative
to the wives of abstinent husbands, women with drinking husbands were 11 percentage points
more likely to also report abuse. Of course, such simple correlations may not represent a causal
effect, and may also be driven by a particular type of measurement error. In spite of the best
efforts of surveyors, it is possible that, in the 1998 wave, women who may be answering both
questions systematically misreport both alcohol consumption and victimization, both of which
are stigmatized behaviors on the part of their husband. The direction of this misreporting is not
obvious. On one hand, reported alcohol consumption might be perceived as an explanation for
violence, but on the other, people might be more inclined to falsely report positive attributes to

6

In 1998, women were asked if their husband had ever beaten them. In 2005, women were asked if their husband
ever: slapped them; twisted their arm or pulled their hair; pushed, shook or threw something at them; punched them;
kicked, dragged or otherwise beat them up; tried to choke or burn them on purpose; threatened them with a weapon;
physically forced them to have intercourse against their will; forced them to perform any sexual acts against their
will. In our primary results we identity women as being victims of domestic violence if they answer affirmatively to
any of the questions about domestic violence.
7
We measure domestic violence exposure based on the respondent’s yes or no answer to a question about general
victimization, rather than an available follow–up question about more recent victimization, for two reasons. First,
while there are differences in wording, both waves of the NFHS ask about general exposure to domestic violence in
the same, relatively direct way. In 2005, the surveyors were instructed to ask about more recent victimization after a
series of other questions about intra-family relationships, making this question difficult to compare to the previous
years. Second, respondents are asked about alcohol consumption in general, rather than recent alcohol consumption,
so a general question about victimization more explicitly covers the same reference period, with similar recall bias.
8
This difference in reporting introduces potential survey-to-survey variation that is taken into account with survey
wave fixed effects. Alcohol consumption was asked only as a binary variable in the 1998 wave, but both the
intensive and extensive margin of consumption was asked in the 2005 wave.
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“balance out” otherwise negative descriptions of their family. Our identification of the
relationship between alcohol consumption, domestic violence, and alcohol regulation is based on
the assumption that misreporting of domestic violence and misreporting of alcohol consumption
is either conditionally independent of the specific location of a state’s MLDA, or affect husbands
of all ages in a particular state.9
III.C. State Level Panel Data on Crimes and Mortality
We also examine the effects of alcohol control on crimes and important public health
outcomes from 1980 to 2010, using administrative state-year panel data from the Indian National
Crime Records Bureau (NCRB). There is ample evidence that increased alcohol consumption
itself is associated with crime (Carpenter and Dobkin 2011). At the same time, tighter regulations
on the sale of alcohol may increase the size of violent black markets. The net effect of alcohol
regulation on crime, if that regulation lowers drinking, is therefore an empirical question.
Continuing with our analysis using individual-level data, we first investigate the effects
of alcohol regulation on violence against women, focusing on four specific types of crime: rape,
sexual molestation, sexual assault, and cruelty by husband and relatives. Next, we turn to other
types of violent crimes in India that could be affected by alcohol control, including murder,
dacoity (robbery by armed gangs of more than 5 people), robbery, and communal violence
(riots). Finally, we investigate the effects of alcohol laws on mortality from injury death, which
include fatalities from road accidents, firearms, alcohol consumption, and spurious liquor
consumption. These are public health outcomes of policy interest, and are included both because

9

Of course, even though these surveys were anonymous, it is possible that men under the MLDA may be less likely
to report that they drink in 2005, biasing these estimates upwards. However, it is less obvious that the household
survey respondent in 1998 will respond in the same way.
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they have been the focus of other research on alcohol control and to provide a more complete
picture of the impact of alcohol regulation in India.
In addition, we collected data on a host of state-specific time-varying variables that may
be correlated with alcohol regulation and crime. These include annual measures of the number of
police per capita from the NRCB, and state GDP per capita and government expenditure on
education and welfare from the Reserve Bank of India. State level unemployment rates,
urbanization, and literacy rates are interpolated from the Decennial Census of India, collected in
1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011. Table 1B reports key summary statistics for these variables.
IV.

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Our empirical strategy will be to identify the impact of alcohol control policies on rates

of alcohol consumption and other pertinent outcomes using policy variation generated by the
regulations governing the legal sale of alcohol in state s in year t: MLDA laws and outright
prohibition, which affect whether or not individual i can legally purchase alcohol in his home
state. The assumptions necessary to identify the impact of alcohol regulation on drinking and
violence vary by data set.
Our individual level data only span a short time period during which only three states
changed their alcohol regulation. Here, our identification strategy is similar to Carpenter and
Dobkin (2009), in that we are comparing the behavior of individuals whose ability to purchase
alcohol legally is a discontinuous function of their age, but we are able to exploit additional
variation across states in the age at which an individual can legally buy alcohol. Unfortunately,
unlike Carpenter and Dobkin (2009), our data do not allow us to implement a true RDD, as we
only know the person’s age in years and have a limited number of observations around the
MLDA thresholds. However, our identification is strengthened by the fact that we are able to
14

exploit the fact that there are four different regimes determining the person’s ability to purchase
alcohol: age 18, age 21, age 25, and prohibition, so we are better able to disentangle the impact
of the age-based alcohol regulation from other influences which vary with age.
Figure 2 depicts the simple means of men between the ages of 15 and 50 who drink,
below and above each minimum legal drinking age threshold, alongside the same aged cohorts in
prohibition states, giving a coarse sense of the independent impact of age on drinking behavior.
Two things are clear: first, that even in dry states, a substantial fraction of men are comfortable
reporting alcohol consumption and second, even in the absence of an age-cutoff, older men are
more likely to drink. However, it is also evident from the states where the MLDA is 21 or 25 that
after husbands reach the drinking age in their state, the fraction consuming alcohol increases
relative to same-aged men living in dry states.
Based on this suggestive pattern, we can confirm that men who are legally allowed to
drink are more likely to consume alcohol by estimating the following linear probability model:
(1)

𝑃(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑦 ) = 𝛿𝑠𝑦 + 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑦 𝛽𝐹𝑆 + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑦 𝜃 + 𝑢ℎ𝑠𝑦

The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the man reports drinking alcohol, or
one of the other socially relevant outcomes that we observe in the NFHS – smoking or domestic
violence (as reported by the man’s wife).10 The main explanatory variable, Legal, is a binary
variable equal to 1 if the man was legally allowed to drink over the past year from the time of the

10

We do not instrument for alcohol consumption using husband legality for several reasons. First, because of the
relatively low F statistics associated with our estimates of legality and alcohol consumption, the MLDA is unlikely
to be a very reliable instrument for alcohol consumption. Second, the exclusion restriction may not hold entirely
because the change in alcohol regimes (especially to and from prohibition) could have aggregate impacts on the
economy and society that could in turn influence criminal behavior. These effects may be amplified in India given
that a large portion of state revenues are derived from alcohol taxes and black markets for liquor are widespread. We
hence focus on reduced form effects.
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survey interview.11 If the state had a blanket prohibition policy in place during the survey year,
this value is equal to zero for all men, since no one is legally allowed to purchase alcohol in
those states. We include as controls age, education level, employment status, religious affiliation,
and family size in the matrix Xhsy. Luca et al (2015) directly estimated the impact of blanket
prohibition on domestic violence. Here, states under prohibition do not directly contribute to the
identification of 𝛽 𝐹𝑆 , but are used to better pin down the values of 𝜃.
Because we observe both men above and below the drinking age in each of the 19 states
represented in this sample, the impact of state-level characteristics that are correlated with the
MLDA, such as state alcohol tax rates, are essentially differenced out by state by survey wave
fixed effects, 𝛿𝑠𝑦 , and do not introduce bias into our estimates, as long as these unobserved
variables impact everyone in the state equally. We will allow for arbitrary correlation in the
unobserved component of drinking, 𝑢ℎ𝑠𝑦 , within each state. Although clustered standard errors
permit heteroskedasticity and within-state error correlation, we may be concerned that the small
number of clusters (19) may lead to standard errors that are downward biased (Cameron et al.
2008, Donald and Lang 2007). We therefore also present p-values produced with wild cluster
bootstrapping (Cameron et al., 2008).
Our empirical approach with the primary reduced form estimating equation for our state
level analysis being:
(2)

𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐴𝑠𝑡 𝛽 + 𝑋𝑠𝑡 𝜃 +𝜀𝑠𝑡

11

We also experimented with defining the explanatory variable as whether the husband was ever allowed to drink
during the reference period, and the results remain similar.

16

where 𝑀𝐿𝐷𝐴𝑠𝑡 is either equal to the MLDA (set to 100 in the case of total prohibition) or a
vector of three dummy variables that indicate whether or not 20 year olds are prohibited from
purchasing alcohol (meaning the MLDA is 21 or higher), whether or not 24 year olds are
prohibited from purchasing alcohol (meaning the MLDA is 25 or higher), and whether or not 30
year olds are prohibited from purchasing alcohol (meaning there is general prohibition). In states
where the MLDA is 18, all three values are equal to 0, and in states with total prohibition, all
values are set to 1. The matrix 𝑋𝑠𝑡 includes annual measures of police per capita, the literacy rate,
GDP per capita, percent urban, and the percent of government expenditures spent on health and
education, and we include 𝛾𝑠 and 𝛿𝑡 are state and year fixed effects, respectively. The error term
𝜀𝑠𝑡 is clustered at the state level. Since we are essentially estimating an aggregated version of the
individual level mechanisms (drinking and violence) modeled in equation 1, all results are
weighted by the annual state population.
Entering the MLDA linearly essentially captures the fact that changing the drinking age
from 18 to 25, or 18 to total prohibition, will have a larger impact on the total amount of alcohol
consumption than lowering the drinking age from 25 to 21. When we relax that parametric
assumption, the estimated values of β1, β2, and β3 represent the net effect of increasingly
stringent regulations on alcohol sales.
V.

RESULTS

V.A.

Alcohol consumption
As discussed in Section I, state institutions tend to be weaker in developing countries, and

attitudes towards alcohol are fundamentally different than in western countries. As a result, it is
possible that Indian alcohol regulation may not have a statistically or substantively significant
impact on actual alcohol consumption. We present our estimates of equation 1 in Table 2.
17

The baseline regression (column 1) examines the pooled cross-sectional relationship
between a man’s likelihood to drink and whether he is legally allowed to drink. Without
additional controls, men who are of legal drinking age are around 5 percentage points more
likely to drink, but the estimate is statistically insignificant. The next column (column 2) adds on
state and interview year fixed effects, and the magnitude of the estimate becomes much larger,
suggesting that state-specific factors, such as norms about drinking, are correlated with both
average individual demand for and legal restrictions on alcohol. In column 3, we control for
individual characteristics of the husband that could affect his propensity to drink, including as his
age, years of schooling, household size, and religion. This doubles the explanatory power of our
model, but decreases the magnitude of the estimate back to around 5 percentage points,
suggesting that individual characteristics also play a large role in determining alcohol
consumption.
Next, in column 4, we allow for state-by-survey wave fixed effects to account for any
state-specific variation over time that may potentially bias our results, such as changes in state
alcohol taxes or time-varying state policies to address drinking. In column 5, we enter state-byage dummies, to allow for potential differential behavior of men of different age groups across
states. We find a strong first stage relationship across most specifications – men who are legally
allowed to drink are more likely to report drinking, and the relationship is statistically significant.
Given that the mean of alcohol consumption for men in the data is approximately 24%, this 5
percentage point change in likelihood of drinking is substantial, representing a 22% increase in
the likelihood of drinking.
We also examine whether wives are more likely to drink if they are of legal drinking age
or if their husbands are of legal drinking age. If lower MLDAs also increase female drinking, our
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aggregate crime results may reflect a combination of behavioral changes by both men and
women cause by to alcohol consumption. In addition, if women married to husbands above the
drinking age were also systematically more likely to drink, this would suggest that these
households were fundamentally different from households with younger husbands. As we show
in panel A of appendix Table A1, being of the legal drinking age does not have a measurable
effect on women’s likelihood of reported drinking; wives of legal drinking age are more likely to
drink, but the point estimates are quite small and imprecisely estimated. In panel B, we show that
there is also scant evidence that the husband of being of legal drinking age affects the wife’s
likelihood of drinking. These results help support the hypothesis that alcohol consumption is
primarily a male activity, and that variation in MLDA is correlated with changes in the
prevalence that men consume alcohol. This also suggests that the general stigma of (reported)
female alcohol consumption is not directly related to alcohol control policy.
V.B. Smoking
We next examine the impact of alcohol regulation on smoking behavior (Panel B, Table
2). Multiple studies of smoking and alcohol consumption in developed countries have found that
these are complements (Dee 1999; Decker and Schwartz 2000). Confirming a similar
relationship in the context of a developing country is useful for public policy and assessing the
full health effects of programs at targeting consumption of either good.
Consistent with the existing research, we find that being legally allowed to drink leads to
a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of smoking, suggesting that smoking and
drinking are complements. If we use the estimate from our preferred specification (including
state-by-wave fixed effects), we find that the likelihood of smoking goes up by 6 percentage
points, representing an increase of approximately 20 percent.
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V.C.

Domestic violence
We then assess the relationship between alcohol regulation and domestic violence.

Alcohol consumption may be related to intimate partner violence through multiple channels.
Some of these imply minimal scope for alcohol policy to reduce violence against women. For
example, if individual preferences for different risky behaviors are positively correlated, people
who drink more will also be more likely to engage in violence of all types (Carpenter and Dobkin
2010). Alcohol consumption may also serve as a form of self-medication in response to other life
stressors, which themselves might directly cause someone to be violent (Khantzian 1997).
However, there is also direct pharmacological effect of drinking on the actions of the drinker–
studies in laboratory and experimental settings have thoroughly demonstrated that intoxication
leads to increases in aggressive behavior (Bushman 1997). By increasing aggression and
heightening emotional responses, alcohol use may increase inter-gender violence. Experiments
have shown that alcohol consumption (or either party) increases the negativity of marital
conflicts (Leonard and Roberts 1998) and verbal expressions of aggressive intentions among
men (Eckhardt 2007). To the extent that a substantively important causal relationship between
alcohol consumption and domestic violence exists, alcohol regulation is a potentially promising
lever that policy makers could use to reduce violence against women, in contrast to other
mechanisms that increase female safety but are more difficult to implement in practice, such as
reducing the male-female wage gap (Aizer 2010).
We use the same empirical model on the sample of only husbands, and include
characteristics of the wife that may influence the likelihood of both drinking and domestic
violence, such as the wife’s age, education, occupation status, and number of children. These
covariates have also been shown to be correlates of domestic violence in other studies
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(Abramsky et al. 2009, Jewkes 2002). In some specifications, we include variables to capture the
degree of the wife’s household bargaining power, including whether she has money of her own
that she can control, whether she believes that her spouse is justified in beating her if he suspects
her of being unfaithful. Aizer (2008) emphasizes that a woman’s relative wage – rather than
actual wage – determines intra-family bargaining power and partner violence, and so we include
proxies for the intra-family wage gap with the age and education gap, which we define in two
ways. First, we use the ratio of her age to her husband’s age, and the ratio of her years of
schooling to her husband’s. Second, we include dummy variables for linear differences in
spousal age and years of education, as couples with larger or smaller differences in age or
education are potentially very different from couples who are more similar.
The results are reported in Table 3. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the likelihood of
the husband reporting drinking. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the likelihood of the wife
reporting domestic violence. As before, the main explanatory variable is a binary variable equal
to 1 if the husband was legally allowed to drink over the past year from the time of the survey
interview.
The data suggest that the impact of alcohol regulation on drinking does not vary
significantly with marital status. Overall, husbands are approximately 23 percent more likely to
drink if they are legally allowed to drink. Next, we take advantage of the fact that we observe
husbands of the same age who may or may not be legally allowed to drink, since the location of
the MLDA threshold varies across states, as well as husbands in the same state with different
access to alcohol. We examine whether or not there is a differential change in the probability that
husbands abuse their wives once men are legally allowed to drink. The results are reported in
Panel B of Table 3. Column 1 in Table 3 shows a positive correlation between the wife reporting
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abuse and whether her husband is legally allowed to drink, although adjusting for the small
number of clusters suggests that the relationship is only marginally precise. In column 2, we
include fixed effects for the state of residence and year of interview, which reduces the
magnitude of the effect to around 3 percentage points and is statistically insignificant. In column
3, we layer on household and husband characteristics, which make the estimated coefficient on
𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 both larger and statistically significant, with p-values just under 10%. In columns 4
through 7, we add the wife socio-economic characteristics and bargaining power variables to the
regression model.
Across all specifications, the coefficient on 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 is positive, and associated with a 5
percentage point increase in the likelihood that the wife reports being a victim of domestic
violence. The precision of this result is somewhat influenced by how we adjust our standard
errors to take into the small number of states in our sample, but we are generally able to reject
the null hypothesis that a husband’s legal access to alcohol is unrelated to his wife’s reports of
victimization with at least 90% certainty.
We do not show the coefficients on the control variables for sake of space, but the signs
are consistent with expectations and the existing literature on domestic violence. For example,
the wife having her own money that she can control is negatively associated with the likelihood
of her being beaten by her husband. There is also a positive correlation between domestic
violence and whether the wife believes that a husband is justified in beating his wife if he
believes her to be unfaithful.12 Further, the higher the ratio of the wife’s years of schooling to her

12

The 1998 wave does not contain information on the husband’s attitudes towards domestic violence, but to the
extent that such attitudes could be endogenously correlated between spouses, we believe the wife’s attitude should
help capture both her bargaining power within the household as well as the husband’s attitude towards domestic
violence.
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husband’s, the less likely the wife experiences intimate partner violence from her husband; the
same goes for age. Relatedly, schooling and occupational status of both spouses are negatively
correlated with domestic violence.
V.D.

Crime
Do our results on domestic violence extends to other types of violence against women or

violent crime in general? As discussed previously, alcohol could be linked to aggressive behavior
through multiple channels, such as direct pharmacological effects (Chermack and Taylor 2015).
We provide some information on this question using state-year panel data on officially recorded
crimes. We then examine whether alcohol regulation affects other types of crime, including
murder, dacoity, robbery, and communal riots. Dacoity is an India-specific penal code that refers
to armed robbery by a gang of more than five people. Communal riots is a distinct and pervasive
feature of Indian public life and are often linked to changing political equations and clash of
religious sentiments (Krishna 1985). Since there are documented pharmacological effects of
alcohol on aggression and inhibition (Miczek et al. 1994), it is worthwhile to investigate whether
violent crime rates are affected.
Our estimates of the relationship between with MLDA and violence against women are
presented in Table 4. With the exception of rape, raising the MLDA is associated with lower
rates of violence against women overall, and in particular reported cruelty and sexual
harassment. The effects are marginally statistically significant and are substantively small. Since
the state-year panel will pick up changes in the behavior of all men, rather than just husbands, it
may be the case that there are not enough young husbands to identify the effect of lowering the
drinking age from 21 to 18 on drinking or violence. Nonetheless, we find some suggestive
evidence that increasing the MLDA from 18 to 21 will lower most crimes against women, but the
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estimates are imprecisely estimated (especially when using the wild bootstrap). Overall, our
results suggest that prohibition, rather than MLDA laws, may have a larger effect on violence
against women.
The pattern between stricter alcohol access and other types of crime is not obvious. Overall,
we find a very imprecise, relationship between stricter alcohol control and general forms of
violence when the MLDA is entered linearly. A shift from a MDLA of 18 to 21 is linked with a
statistically significant decline in dacoity (robbery by armed gangs), and stricter access to alcohol
appears to be positively associated with higher incidence of communal violence, but the evidence
on other types of crime is otherwise mixed. While we found evidence that higher MLDAs
reduced male drinking, this ambiguous impact of overall violence is consistent with stricter
alcohol control leading to more dangerous drinking, and also with the formation of violent
underground markets for alcohol, particularly in states that are completely dry. This type of
market based violence more generally tends to affect men, rather than women (Owens 2014).
V.E.

Other Public Health Outcomes
Finally, we examine the effects of alcohol regulation on important public health

outcomes, as measured by mortality caused by road accidents, firearms, overall alcohol
poisoning, and consumption of unregulated alcohol (e.g. home-brewed alcohol) (Table 5).
Stricter alcohol regulation is negatively associated with lower mortality from road accidents.
However, the estimates do not reach statistical significance (p=0.15). The negative relationship
between MLDA and driving accidents is consistent with the literature from the US (Carlos and
Dobkin 2009; Kaestner and Yarnoff 2009). Most of the existing evidence from developed
country settings suggest that the impact of higher MLDA would fall mainly on young adults.
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Hence, our analysis using aggregate data may not pick up the effects of stricter alcohol regimes
on specific age groups.
Our results suggest that stricter alcohol regulation is negatively linked to mortality from
overall alcohol consumption but possibly higher mortality from consumption of unregulated
liquor. That stricter regulation of alcohol is linked with negative health outcomes due to
consumption of spurious liquor is consistent with anecdotal evidence, where numerous poisoning
cases from consuming liquor produced on the black market have been reported in recent years,
with perhaps the most infamous case occurring in 2009 in Gujarat which resulted in 136 deaths.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we set out with the goal to investigate the effects of alcohol regulation in the
context of India. Specifically, we take advantage of rich individual-level data, staggered timing
in age-based alcohol regulation across states, to examine how alcohol control affects drinking,
smoking, and domestic violence. We find substantive evidence that reducing access to alcohol
through MLDA laws decreases the likelihood of drinking, smoking, and domestic violence. We
caveat that these results may not generalize to other developing countries, as India is unique in
many aspects, in particular the complicated role of alcohol in society. In this particular case,
however, in spite of the generally weak view of legal institutions and perceptions of entrenched
government corruption, laws restricting alcohol consumption do appear to influence behavior.
Our first stage results of higher alcohol consumption by men who are legally allowed to
drink are consistent with multiple other studies. Rahman (2003) shows that alcohol prohibition
policies in India are associated with a 20%-40% decrease in the probability of alcohol
consumption and a 40% decrease in the quantity of alcohol consumed using household
expenditure data. A number of studies have used data from the Monitoring the Future survey, a
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representative sample of high school seniors from schools across the United States, to
demonstrate that government regulation does indeed impact alcohol consumption among youth
(Carpenter et al., 2007, Dee 1999, DiNardo and Lemieux 2001.) Cook and Moore (2001) find a
similar result using data on young adults from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youths. In
more recent work, Carpenter and Dobkin (2010) find that individuals in the United States just
over age 21 are 31% more likely to report having recently consumed alcohol and report drinking
on almost 60% more days than individuals just under 21.
While similar to estimates from the developed world, our results should be interpreted in the
context of survey evidence on the role that alcohol consumption plays in Indian society. Recent
reports on drinking in India suggest that the signature pattern of alcohol consumption in India is
frequent and heavy drinking. More than half of all drinkers fall into the criteria for hazardous
drinking, which is characterized by bingeing and solitary consumption to the point of
intoxication (Prasad 2009). In the 2005 wave of the NFHS, around 10% of drinkers report
drinking every day, and a third of drinkers consume alcohol more than once a week. Moreover,
spirits account for 95% of the beverages drunk in India. Although we do not have indicators for
the quantity of alcohol consumed, it could be that husbands who are reported to drink are more
than just casual drinkers. While we are unable to measure binge drinking, we do observe that
MLDA laws are likely to promote public health outcomes on at least two dimensions.
We also provide evidence on the effects of alcohol regulation on a host of other
significant public health outcomes. First, our analysis using individual level data on self-reported
smoking behavior suggests that alcohol and tobacco are complements, a finding that is consistent
with existing research in developed country settings. Further, we provide suggestive evidence
that stricter alcohol regulation reduces some forms of violence against women using both
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individual and state-year panel data. While there have been a number of papers examining the
impact of alcohol regulation on crime, there has been a much smaller body of work focusing on
violence against women. Most of these studies examine the impact of alcohol prices on violence
against women using variation generated by state excise taxes. Markowitz (2000) examined
spousal violence in the U.S. in the late 1980s. In models with individual fixed effects, she
estimated that a 1% increase in alcohol price would reduce abuse aimed at wives by 5%. She also
analyzes US panel data on individuals in the 1990s, and finds that higher beer taxes have a
(marginally) significant inverse relationship with physical assault but no substantive relationship
with rape/sexual assault or robbery. Markowitz (2001) uses two waves of international survey
data, and finds that these prices exhibit significant negative associations with the rates of assault,
robbery, and sexual assault against women in the cross-section but that the associations are no
longer statistically significant when country fixed effects are included in the regressions.
Durrance et al. (2011) finds large positive correlations between alcohol consumption and female
homicides at the state level, but focusing only on the plausibly exogenous variation in alcohol
consumption driven by excise taxes yields a positive but small and statistically insignificant
relationship. Grossman and Markowitz (1999) find that violence on college campuses, including
both taking advantage of another person sexually or having been taken advantage of sexually, are
inversely related to the price of beer in the state of the college.
Finally, we do not find strong evidence that stricter alcohol regulation affects other types
of crime or public health outcomes. We find some suggestive evidence that stricter alcohol
regulation is linked to fewer fatalities stemming from motor vehicle accidents and drinking. At
the same time, stricter alcohol control is associated with more communal violence and deaths
from consuming spurious liquor. However, the precision of our estimates precludes any strong
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conclusions. The lack of impacts on crime is consistent with the existing mixed evidence from
the US, where “Blue Law” restrictions of the sale of alcohol on Sundays have been found to
lower crime (Heaton 2012, Han et al 2016), but age-based restrictions can be associated with
increased aggregate crime, particularly drug offenses (Conlin et al 2005). At the same time, well
identified research on the impact of alcohol regulation in the US has found that this type of
alcohol regulation can generate statistically and substantively meaningful reductions in violent
crime overall (Carpenter and Dobkin 2015, Carpenter 2007). As more, and better quality, survey
data on Indian crime and victimization become available, the impacts of alcohol control on
violence in developing countries may become clearer.
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FIGURE 1. MLDAS IN INDIA, 1980-2010

P – Prohibition, 18 – State had a minimum legal drinking age of 18 between 1980 and 2010,
21 – State had a minimum legal drinking age of 18 between 1980 and 2010,
25 – State had a minimum legal drinking age of 25 between 1980 and 2010.
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FIGURE 2. FRACTION OF ALL MEN WHO DRINK, RELATIVE TO THEIR AGE IN
RELATION TO THE STATE’S MLDA AND SAME AGE COHORTS IN PROHIBITION
STATES

14

16

18
Age

22

Prohibition States

.25
.2
.15
.1
.05
20

22
MLDA=25

24

Age

26

28

16

18
MLDA=21

.3

MLDA=18

20

30

Prohibition States

34

20

Age

22

24

Prohibition States

26

TABLE 1A. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES IN THE NFHS
Variable

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Obs.

All men (ages 15 to 50)
Proportion:
Drinks
Smokes
Chews tobacco
Can drink legally
Married
Hindu
Muslim

0.235
0.299
0.248
0.478
0.605
0.757
0.121
29.78
7.21
6.558

0.424
0.458
0.432
0.500
0.489
0.429
0.326
10.15
4.89
3.518

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
0
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
50
24
46

208,356
208,362
208,360
208,437
208,091
208,091
208,091
208,360
208,141
208,091

Husband drinks
Husband smokes
Wife drinks
Wife reports domestic violence
Husband is of legal drinking age
Urban residence
Wife believes that husband is justified in
beating spouse if he suspects her of being
unfaithful
Wife has own money that she can control
Hindu
Muslim
Age of husband
Years of husband's schooling
Number of children
Years of wife's schooling
Age of wife
Household size
Ratio of wife's schooling to husband's
Ratio of wife's age to husband's

0.301
0.456
0.021
0.179
0.929
0.322

0.459
0.498
0.142
0.384
0.257
0.467

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1

83,364
83,364
83,359
83,358
83,364
83,364

0.305

0.461

0

1

83,364

0.543
0.808
0.117
39.7
5.98
2.957
3.581
33.8
5.415
0.898
0.852

0.498
0.394
0.321
8.818
5.075
1.684
4.617
8.07
2.248
1.146
0.1

0
0
0
15
0
0
0
15
1
0.01
0.31

1
1
1
60
24
14
23
49
35
18
1.91

83,364
83,364
83,364
83,364
83,364
83,364
83,364
83,364
83,364
83,263
83,364

Age
Years of schooling
Household Size
Husbands (ages 15 to 50)
Proportion:

Underlying data are from the NFHS-2 and NFHS-3 waves.
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TABLE 1B. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF STATE-YEAR PANEL DATA ON CRIMES, MORTALITY, AND CONTROLS
Std.
Variable
Mean
Min
Max
Obs.
Dev.
Crime Rates of:
Cruelty by husbands and
relatives
436.88
379.60
0.00 1972.47
358
Molestation
340.59
249.31
7.14
1169.66
358
Sexual harassment
111.45
278.23
0.00 2777.26
358
Rape
156.26
166.27
20.64
984.13
420
Murder
339.82
164.30
98.96 1963.11
420
Robbery
210.13
138.79
4.91
961.18
420
Communal violence
1220.4
1268.1
0 10307.4
420
Dacoity
88.72
133.07
0.00 2000.00
420
Road accidents deaths
814.78
537.42
79.49 2356.18
497
Firearm deaths
13.32
26.88
0.00
178.45
497
Alcohol deaths
36.73
38.36
0.00
306.36
272
Spurious liquor deaths
12.84
21.42
0.00
236.11
450
Other State Characteristics:
Literacy rate
61.55
14.34
29.27
90.92
510
Percent urban
32.82
18.31
10.47
97.50
510
GDP per capita 11907.46 6834.85 1800.00 41487.83
517
Unemployment rate
2.99
2.41
0.28
14.30
510
Police per capita
1.61
1.43
0.55
10.99
480
Underlying data on crime and police per capita are from the National Crimes Records
Bureau, 1990 - 2010. Crime and mortality rates are measured per 10,000 population.
State real GDP per capita are from the Reserve Bank of India. State level unemployment
rates, urbanization, and literacy rates are interpolated from the Decennial Census of
India, collected in 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2011.
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{0.0080}†††

208356
0.00
0.1212
(0.0350)***

{0.1698}

0.0495
(0.0346)

(1)

{0.0000}†††

208356
0.10
0.2608
(0.0293)***

{0.0000}†††

0.1924
(0.0158)***

(2)

{0.0919}†

208091
0.17
0.058
(0.0264)**

{0.0060}†††

0.0532
(0.0153)***

(3)

{0.0899}†

208091
0.17
0.0637
(0.0270)**

{0.0060}†††

0.0528
(0.0159)***

(4)

{0.1778}

208091
0.18
0.0266
(0.0160)

{0.0020}†††

0.0444
(0.0076)***

(5)

TABLE 2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BEING OF LEGAL DRINKING AGE AND ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
AND SMOKING AMONG MEN AGES 15 TO 50

Panel A: Dependent VariableDrink Alcohol
N
R2
Panel B: Dependent VariableSmoke

208362
208362
208068
208068
208068
N
0.02
0.08
0.18
0.18
0.20
R2
State FE
x
x
x
x
Year FE
x
x
x
x
Controls
x
x
x
State by Survey Wave FE
x
State by Age Group FE
x
Sample includes all men between ages 15 to 50 in NFHS-2 and NFHS-3. Controls for husband include age, years of schooling,
whether he belongs to a white-collar occupation, household size, urban residence, religion, and number of children. Controls for
wife also include these variables plus, her attitudes towards domestic violence, whether she has money of her own that she controls,
and the wife to husband age and schooling ratios.
Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by state. * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%
P-values in braces are adjusted using wild-t bootstrap. † p≤ 0.1 ††p≤ 0.05 ††† p≤ 0.01

37

{0.106}

0.0854
(0.0165)***

83364
0.01

(1)
0.1439
(0.0499)***
{0.112}

83358

{0.230}

0.0329
(0.0245)

83364
0.04

(2)
0.0419
(0.0218)*
{0.094}†

83358

{0.056}†

0.0556
(0.0254)**

83364
0.09

(3)
0.0787
(0.0167) ***
{0.006}†††

0.06

83257

{0.096}†

0.0525
(0.0280)*

83263
0.10

(4)
0.0748
(0.0170)***
{0.006}†††

0.06

82723

{0.098}†

0.0503
(0.0268)*

82728
0.10

(5)
0.0732
(0.0172)***
{0.006}†††

0.07

83257

{0.096}†

0.0517
(0.0280)*

83263
0.10

(6)
0.0749
(0.0172)***
{0.006}†††

0.07

83358

{0.089}†

0.0486
(0.0258)*

83364
0.10

{0.006}†††

(7)
0.0713
(0.0165)***

83358

0.06

x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

0.03

x
x

x

x

x
x
x
x

0

TABLE 3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BEING OF LEGAL DRINKING AGE AND ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Panel A: Dependent Variable
- Husband drinks alcohol
N
R2

R2

Panel B: Dependent Variable
- Wife reports domestic
violence
N
Controls
Husband
Wife
Husband/Wife Ratios
Fixed Effects
State
Year
Age Gap
Education Gap
State by Survey Wave
State by Age Gap
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Sample includes husbands between ages 15 and 50 in the NFHS-2 and NFHS-3 waves. Controls for husband include age, years of schooling,
whether he belongs to a white-collar occupation, household size, urban residence, religion, and number of children. Controls for wife also
include these variables plus, her attitudes towards domestic violence, whether she has money of her own that she controls, and the wife to
husband age and schooling ratios. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by state. * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% ***
significant at 1%. P-values in braces are adjusted using wild-t bootstrap. † p≤ 0.1 ††p≤ 0.05 ††† p≤ 0.01.
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Table 4. The impact of alcohol regulation on crime
Cruelty n=314

(1)
MLDA

(2)

(6)

(7)
0.296

(0.926)***

(0.498)

(0.512)***

(0.187)

Prohibition
0.77

{0.384}

{0.07}

†

{0.597}

-263.5

-120.4

-132.6

28.7

(24.10)***

(18.91)***

(12.92)**

{0.251}

{0.188}

{0.288}

{0.136}

139.8

-68.78

-33.9

-5.0

(53.63)

(59.4)

(23.0)

(9.41)

{0.274}

{0.496}

{0.352}

{0.689}

-309.8

26.99

-72.1

14.35

(92.59)***

(67.67)

(27.94)***

(8.47)

{0.406}

{0.799}

{0.212}

{0.184}

0.78

0.94

0.95

Dacoity n=395

0.77

0.79

Robbery n=395

0.94
0.94
Communal violence
n=395
4.19

0.033

0.152

0.164

(0.225)

(0.206)

(0.184)

(1.58)***

{0.829}

{0.509}

{0.367}

{0.206}

58.7

MLDA ≥
21
MLDA ≥
25

Prohibition
0.65

(8)

(104.4)**

Murder n=395

R2

(5)
-1.435

MLDA ≥
25

MLDA

(4)

Rape n=395

-0.523

MLDA ≥
21

R

(3)

Sexual Harassment
n=314

-2.8
{0.13}

2

Molestation n=314

-50

92.1

-317

(18.8)***

(25.3)**

(52.6)

(313)

{0.184}

{0.064}†

{0.833}

{0.693}

2.95

2.94

26.8

236

(19.1)

(27.7)

(43.3)

(122)*

{0.897}

{0.939}

0.693}

{0.310}

-28.4

33.7

-55.7

276

(18.8)

(22.2)

(49.0)

(170)

{0.258}

{0.272}

{0.544}

0.66

0.75

0.75

0.75

0.76

0.75

{0.246}
0.74

All regressions include controls for the state literacy rate, the fraction of people living in urban areas, per capita gdp,
the unemployment rate, the number of police per capita, and state and year fixed effects, and are weighted by state
population. The omitted minimum legal drinking age is 18. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by
state. * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. P-values in braces are adjusted for small clusters
using wild-t bootstrap. † p≤ 0.1 ††p≤ 0.05 1 ††† p≤ 0.01.
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Table 5. The impact of alcohol regulation on mortality

MLDA

MLDA ≥ 21

MLDA ≥ 25

Prohibition
R2

Road Accidents
n=440
-0.700
(0.510)
{0.156}
8.746
(40.892)
{0.763}
-22.068
(43.891)
{0.605}
-39.401
(44.141)
{0.334}
0.88

0.88

Firearms n=415
0.080
(0.083)
{0.420}

Alcohol n=239
-0.104
(0.111)
{0.396}

2.119
(3.723)
{0.701}
-3.195
(2.698)
{0.242}
8.412
(5.784)
{0.328}
0.88

0.88

Spurious Liquor n=399
0.046
(0.051)
{0.456}

-2.850
(2.117)
{0.314}
26.153
(5.143)***
{0.214}
-28.846
(6.209)***
{0.030}††
0.94

0.94

7.273
(2.637)**
{0.424}
-7.965
(11.910)
{0.691}
8.096
(13.171)
{0.875}
0.51

0.51

All regressions include controls for the state literacy rate, the fraction of people living in urban areas, per capita gdp,
the unemployment rate, the number of police per capita, and state and year fixed effects, and are weighted by state
population. The omitted minimum legal drinking age is 18. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by
state. * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%. P-values in braces are adjusted for small
clusters using wild-t bootstrap. † p≤ 0.1 ††p≤ 0.05 1 ††† p≤ 0.01.
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0.0091*
(0.0046)

(1)
0.0056*
(0.0032)

(2)

-0.0059
(0.0064)

0.0028
(0.0028)

(3)

-0.0050
(0.0066)

0.0015
(0.0032)

-0.0063
(0.0065)

0.0024
(0.0030)

-0.0051
(0.0066)

0.0015
(0.0031)

(6)

-0.0055
(0.0065)

0.0031
(0.0030)

(7)

x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

-0.0039
(0.0073)

x
x

x

x

x
x
x
x

0.0115*
(0.0066)

Wife Reports Drinking
(4)
(5)

APPENDIX TABLE A1. THE IMPACT OF ALCOHOL REGULATION ON ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION OF WIVES
Dependent Variable:
1(Wife of Legal Drinking Age)
1(Husband of Legal Drinking
Age)
Controls
Husband
Wife
Husband/Wife Ratios
Fixed Effects
State
Year
Age Gap
Education Gap
State by Survey Wave
State by Age Gap

Underlying data are from the NFHS 1998 and 2005 waves. Controls for husband includes age, years of schooling, whether he belongs to a
white-collar occupation, household size, urban residence, religion, and number of children Controls for wife includes age, years of schooling,
whether she belongs to a white-collar occupation, and number of children. To control for her household bargaining power, we include her
attitudes towards domestic violence, whether she has money of her own that she controls, and the wife to husband age and schooling ratios.
Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by state. * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1%.
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